The wave of sovereign defaults in the early 1980s and the string of debt crises in the decades that followed have fostered proposals involving policy interventions in sovereign debt restructurings. A key question about these proposals that has proved hard to handle is how they influence the behavior of creditors and debtors. We address such challenge by incorporating these policy proposals into a quantitative model in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) that includes renegotiation in sovereign debt restructurings. Critically, the model also endogenizes the choice of debt maturity, an essential aspect of sovereign defaults and restructurings. We evaluate several policy interventions, and we identify the crucial features that matter to improve the outcome of distressed debt restructurings and reduce the frequency of debt distress events.
Introduction
The sovereign debt crises of the last decades, including those in Latin American in the early 1980s, Russia (1997 Russia ( -1998 , Argentina (2001 Argentina ( -2002 , Ukraine (2015) , and Greece (2011) (2012) , among many others, have encouraged the development of proposals and frameworks aimed at improving the structure of sovereign debt and the resolution of sovereign debt crises. These proposals are wide-ranging, including arrangements to create an international lender of last resort (LOLR), developing practices and instruments that improve incentives for borrowers and creditors to agree on a prompt, orderly and predictable restructuring of unsustainable debt, lowering debt levels and lengthening debt maturity, among other measures. 1
In this paper, we analyze policy proposals related to some of these topics in the context of sovereign debt restructurings, and we explore the implications of such policies not only for debt renegotiations but also for the dynamics of sovereign debt in normal times.
Our renegotiation framework allows the model to rationalize several stylized facts of sovereign debt restructurings, while also capturing fundamental debt dynamics over the business cycle.
Therefore, we use our new quantitative model as a laboratory to provide new insights about the role of frequently used policy interventions on debt restructuring outcomes and on sovereign debt dynamics more generally. The policies discussed below are the focus of the paper.
First, we consider the effects of imposing a minimum haircut. In contrast to common perception, a minimum debt reduction can provide a better restructuring outcome because it guarantees some debt relief to the borrower, for whom it becomes more feasible to engage in a larger debt maturity extension. Brookings (2013) points to evidence that policymakers are often reluctant to restructure their debts and suboptimally postpone unavoidable defaults. In a report discussing recent sovereign debt restructuring experiences, the IMF (2013b) has highlighted that "allowing an unsustainable debt situation to fester is costly to the debtor, creditors and the international monetary system." The financial media (see Financial Times, "The IMF approach to sovereign debt restructuring", May 13, 2014) has pointed out that in two of the largest-ever sovereign defaults, Greece and Argentina, procrastination not only delayed the inevitable, but made matters 1 See for instance, Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006) .
1 worse for private creditors as a group, and more importantly, for the countries economic and financial systems.
Second, we assess the impact of alternative distributions of losses across lenders holding bonds of different maturities. One of the sources of uncertainty under the existing framework is how inter-creditor equity issues should be resolved. 2 In circumstances where there is a diverse group of external creditors holding differentiated claims, to what extent will all of them be subject to the restructuring and, if so, what criteria will be used for purposes of determining whether the restructuring terms they receive should be the same as, or differ from, other creditors? While this problem has many different facets, including the relative treatment of domestic and external debt, one issue that has proven particularly difficult is the treatment of claims with different residual maturities. For instance, for restructuring purposes, should one take into consideration the differing expectations of creditors under the original terms of the instruments? According to IMF reports, a number of commentators have suggested that prior to, and in the immediate aftermath of, default, debts of differing maturity should be restructured in a fashion that extends maturities on each instrument, but broadly preserves the original relative residual maturities.
Then, for instance, a group of bonds with similar maturities could be restructured into new instruments with a maturity extension of, say, 5 years. It has been argued that this so called 'bucket approach' can be seen as helping to preserve inter-creditor equity, while at the same time producing a post-restructuring debt stock that allows a market-based yield curve to be established rapidly. On the other hand, bondholders have also expressed concern that such differential treatment may result in discriminatory treatment, and that such a 'bucket' approach may lead to manipulation, for example, by forcing investors holding the shorter maturities to accept a disproportionate share of the burden. Moreover, it is possible that the distribution of losses across creditors has more general implications for the dynamics of debt not only in restructurings but also during normal times.
Third, the global financial crisis has highlighted the debate not only about the optimality of international lender of last resort (LOLR) bailouts during sovereign debt crises, but also about the design of effective global financial safety nets to help countries cope with adverse shocks. In this vein, the IMF has implemented lending reforms to complement its traditional crisis resolution role with more effective tools for crisis prevention, including programs such as the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) and the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), which have been designed to flexibly meet the liquidity needs of member countries with sound economic fundamentals and varying degrees of vulnerabilities. The IMF has underscored that Fund lending in debt restructuring cases would be expected to be within normal access limits, in recognition of the member's fragile debt situation until the process of restructuring is completed. Possible uses of IMF assistance reportedly would include reconstituting foreign exchange reserves, providing financing for needed imports of goods and services, and supporting the rehabilitation of the domestic banking system, among others. More generally, the IMF has pointed out that financial assistance to a member in the process of restructuring its debt should support the member's effort to reach a sustainable growth path as soon as possible.
Fourth, we evaluate the use of GDP-indexed bonds during restructurings. As pointed out in 2012 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in situations of debt distress, borrowers would benefit from some 'breathing space' to identify and implement a sound policy framework to promote sustainable adjustment, preserve asset values and support growth, to the mutual benefit of debtors and creditors. Some proposals in this regard have involved the inclusion of terms for standstills in bond and loan contracts, and the amendment of article VIII 2b of the IMF Articles of Agreement, to include capital account transfers. 3 Another instrument for debt management and a sovereign risk-reduction tool that could help improve the resilience of the public finances to economic downturns and improve public debt sustainability is GDP-indexed debt.
Indexed debt offers a tradeoff between increased resilience to economic shocks and the risk premia likely to be required by bondholders due to increased risk sharing, and thus the likely additional funding cost for the borrowing country. GDP-indexed bonds should preferably be long term securities, for reasons that range from neutrality with respect to GDP revisions to the desirability of high duration (see IMF (2017)). There is also broad recognition that, except for cases in which GDP-indexed bonds are introduced in the context of a debt restructuring, it would several years of consistent issuance before the share of these bonds in total government debt became large enough to significantly enhance the resilience of public debt to adverse economic shocks (see Hermitte (2018) ). While these bonds may induce moral hazard, a proper mix of conventional and GDP-linked bonds could set the right incentives for governments to pursue responsible fiscal policies. In light of these considerations, we study a policy where the country has the option to issue GDP-indexed bonds with long maturity in the context of a debt restructuring.
Our analysis borrows from different strands of the literature on sovereign debt default, maturity, and restructuring. Following the seminal work in international sovereign debt by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , a large portion of the literature on quantitative models of sovereign debt default has used only one-period debt (Arellano, 2008; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006, among others) . Models with long debt duration, such as Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) , feature exogenous maturity. In contrast, our quantitative model features endogenous sovereign debt maturity and repayment under debt dilution. The work of Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) also includes the choice of maturity, but there are several important differences (see also Hatchondo and Martinez, 2013; Hatchondo et al., 2016; Bai et al., 2014) . Our modeling of debt maturity follows that in Sánchez, Sapriza and Yurdagul (2018) , which uses a quantitative model that incorporates debt maturity as the choice of the number of periods for which payments will be made. in order to understand maturity choice and the term structure of interest rate spreads but does not consider debt restructurings.
Our work is also related to recent models on sovereign default and restructurings. Yue (2010) , Benjamin and Wright (2013) , Asonuma and Trebesch (2016) and Asonuma and Joo (2017) study different aspects of sovereign debt restructurings in the context of one-period bond models. Mihalache (2017) explores sovereign debt restructurings and maturity extensions appealing to political economy considerations. Passadore and Xu (2018) introduces bonds with long maturity and debt restructuring in a sovereign default model, but focuses on illiquidity in the secondary markets of sovereign debt and considers both the maturity and the outcomes of debt restructurings to be exogenous. The closest to our framework is the work of Dvorkin, Sánchez, Sapriza and Yurdagul (2019) , which explains why debt maturity extensions are usually the output of debt restructurings.
Our work is also related to other types of default resolution or prevention mechanisms. The work of Bianchi (2016) and Roch and Uhlig (2016) study the desirability of bailouts. They show that in some cases bailouts may induce additional borrowing offsetting its potential benefits. Hatchondo, Martinez and Sosa Padilla (2014) and Hatchondo, Martinez, Kursat-Onder and Roch (2017) find a similar result analyzing the introduction of contingent convertible bonds (cocos) and voluntary debt exchanges, respectively.
Finally, we evaluate policies allowing for disagreement between the rate of discount of the government and the individuals populating the economy as in Aguiar, Amador and Fourakis (2019) . In general, the government may be impatient than individuals because of political economy considerations. This implies that individuals prefer policies that reduce the amount of debt and the rate of default. Without disagreement, the risk is that welfare gains favor policy that increase debt just because to capture the dynamics of emerging markets the model requires a very impatient government.
The Proposed Policy Interventions

A Minimum Haircut in Restructuring
In a recent report reviewing recent sovereign debt restructuring experiences, the IMF (IMF (2013a)) suggests that debt situations get worse slowly over several years before restructurings occur (they come too late), and they do not always restore sustainability and market access in a durable manner, leading to repeated restructurings (they do too little).
In terms of "too late," the IMF reports argues that Belize had a restructuring in 2007, but the IMF staff had noticed issues with debt sustainability in 2005. Similarly, Seychelles, which defaulted in 2008 and restructured its debt in 2009-10, had unsustainable debt according to the IMF since 2003.
As evidence of "too little," the report highlights that the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Jamaica needed IMF assistance after their restructurings, and that five of the nine countries they studied had two or more restructurings.
Finally, suggesting a solution to these issues, the IMF report mentions that restructuring restored debt sustainability only in a few cases . And in those cases, a substantial haircut was critical. For example, in Seychelles, the 45 to 50 percent haircut was crucial to reduce public debt from about 130 percent of GDP to 78 percent in 2012. A related point is made by Schroder (2014) . He estimates the probability of follow-up restructurings and finds that more comprehensive debt reduction decrease the probability of serial restructurings significantly.
A similar point was made more recently by Guzman, Ocampo and Stiglitz (2016) . They argue that sovereign debt restructurings come too late and do too little. Though they impose enormous costs on societies, these restructurings are often not deep enough to provide the conditions for economic recovery. They suggest that restructurings should provide countries with a fresh start.
Incorporating a minimum haircut in negotiations between the country and lenders is simple in our setup. At the time of making an offer, we restrict the value of total debt issued to be smaller than a share of the nominal value of the default debt. Of course, in our model, minimum haircuts will affect the equilibrium interest rates charged to countries and countries will take haircuts into account at the time of deciding borrowing and default.
A Rule for Distributing Losses across Creditors
One of the factors affecting coordination among bondholders is it is not clear how to redistribute the losses across bondholders with bonds of different maturities. In particular, as shown by Asonuma, Trebesch and Ranciere (2015) , creditors with short maturity securities suffer significantly more than creditors with long maturity securities during recent sovereign debt restructuring episodes. We evaluate the implementation of a mechanism that determines how the redistribute losses.
Proposals for strengthening the arrangements for sovereign debt restructurings aim to make the restructuring of unsustainable debt more orderly, predictable, and rapid. The IMF has recognized that the achievement of these objectives requires addressing a number of weaknesses in the existing sovereign debt restructuring system, including collective action problems and 6 creditor coordination issues. 4 When designing a mechanism that will address these weaknesses, the aggregation of creditor claims for voting purposes can contribute to the resolution of these issues. Notwithstanding the potential benefits of aggregation, on different occasions the IMF has highlighted the fear that strong aggregation mechanisms could lead to inter-creditor equity concerns where, for example, a majority of creditors holding a certain type of claims impose an agreement on a minority of creditors that hold very different claims. Such a problem could arise where the aggregation involves claims of different seniority, or where the claims being aggregated continue to have different maturities. 5 Clearly, creditors with differing residual maturities have differing economic interests. If all creditors holding nondefaulted claims were forced to accept the same long-term instrument in a restructuring, creditor holding claims with relatively short residual maturities would bear a disproportionate burden as compared to those holding claims with relatively long residual maturities.
This "one size fits all" approach was implemented in the Greek sovereign debt restructuring in 2011-2012. The symmetric treatment of bonds in Greece created much larger NPV haircuts for holders of shorter-dated bonds. Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati (2013) consider alternative ways that could have increased debt relief or reduced the large amount of EFSF-financed cash incentives. From that perspective, the study argues that the one size fits all approach of offering the same bundle of new bonds and cash to all investors, irrespective of the maturity of their old bonds, and with no distinction between foreign law bonds and Greek law bonds, was the costliest mistake in the design of the Greek debt restructuring. They show that imposing a 70 percent haircut on all investors would have resulted in an additional debt relief of almost 30 billion in face value terms and 23 billion in present value terms. A 70 percent haircut would have been lower than the haircut that was deemed to be acceptable for short term creditors (about 80 percent), and thus surely feasible. The study also points out three reasons motivating the one-size-fits all approach: First, the intention to keep things simple in order to get the deal done before March 20, 2012 when the next very large bond was coming due (14.4 billion); second, that the members of the creditor committee were likely mostly invested in longer-dated Greek instruments; and 4 See IMF (2003) . 5 See Francois (2003) and IMF (2013b) third, that the so called Troika, Greece, and the creditor committee may have been sympathetic to taking a tough approach against short-term creditors, many of which had deliberately bought short-dated instruments at large discounts in the hope of still being repaid in full.
The motivating reasons presented above were analyzed in the context of the Greek restructuring, but they could well apply to other episodes. In fact, this resolution approach has been documented recently for other exchanges, including Pakistan in 1999, Moldova in 2002, or Cote D'Ivoire in 2010. While restructurings offering the same menu of new instruments across creditors clearly tilt losses toward short term bondholders, Asonuma, Trebesch and Ranciere (2015) reports more generally a difference in haircuts associated with a difference in maturity of instruments, where haircuts on short-term debt are larger than those on long-term debt. Over their sample of recent restructurings, the study documents an average difference of 17.2 percent in haircuts on short-term vs. long-term debt.
Thus, the analysis of the distribution of losses across creditors holding instruments of different maturities may help make the process of debt restructuring more predictable by improving creditor coordination and facilitating the resolution of issues relating to inter-creditor equity. At the same time,
An International Lender of Last Resort
During sovereign debt crises, domestic policy adjustments are frequently not enough to fill external financing gaps due to strong capital outflows and the unwillingness of creditors to rollover short-term claims on the country. Therefore, crisis resolution has generally also involved some combination of private financing in the form of bail-ins of private investors, and official financing (bailouts) by international financial institutions, in particular the IMF, and by other official creditors. In this regard, one view is that an international lender of last resort (LOLR), such as the IMF, could reduce the cost and frequency of crises (Sachs (1995) ), while others (see the The Meltzer Comission Report (2000) ) claim that the LOLR induces moral hazard, so IMF interventions should be limited in frequency and size so as to reduce moral hazard distortions, even if limited support would not prevent liquidity runs. Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2006) highlight that the IMF supports partial bailouts that, together with policy adjustment by the borrower, can restore investors confidence and voluntary lending, and thus help restore debt market access. A natural question that arises in this context is whether these partial bailouts or the corner solutions of large full bailouts or full bailins are more efficient in reducing the cost and frequency of debt crises. Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2006) address this question in a stylized theoretical three-period model of sovereign debt with an international LOLR that is concerned with the inefficiency costs associated with early liquidation, but cannot provide subsidized loans or grants to a country with bad fundamentals.
Other earlier important suggestions regarding the LOLR have been made by Calomiris (1998) and Calomiris and Meltzer (1998) . They have recommended that the IMF act only as LOLR under Bagehot rules, and only to countries that meet some requirements. Fischer (1999) and Conway (2006) have argued that only countries that meet specified standards be eligible to borrow from the LOLR as this would provide a powerful additional incentive to adopt these standards. There have been policies similar to this one, such as the one that the IMF introduced at the end of 1997, the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), which can make short-term loans in large amounts at penalty rates to countries in crisis.
Our paper contributes to the LOLR debate by providing a quantitative model of sovereign debt restructuring that allows for policy trade-offs in the lending by an international financial institution. Our setup helps understand the implications of the LOLR for the behavior of the borrower and the creditors not only during restructurings, but also going into default and upon exiting the restructuring process.
GDP-Indexed Bonds Issued in Restructurings
Since Shiller (1993) proposed the idea of GDP-indexed bonds, it has been increasingly discussed in academic and policymaker circles. The idea behind these instruments is straightforward: by improving risk sharing between the borrowing country and international creditors, GDP-indexed bonds may diminish the probability of debt crises and increase welfare. The string of sovereign debt crises especially since the 2000s, renewed the interest in the use of GDP-indexed debt as part of the design of sovereign debt contracts. This may be a useful instrument to facilitate debt restructurings. Drèze (2000) suggested the use of GDP-indexed bonds as part of a strategy to restructure the debt of the poorest countries, and Borensztein and Mauro (2002a, 2004) Greek bonds. The GDP warrants were a small sweetener, with value equivalent to about 0.2 percent of the original notional, or around 400 million euros. The GDP warrants were set to mature on October 15, 2042.
More recently, Ukraine issued GDP-linked securities, known as warrants, to creditors who wrote down 20 percent of bonds original value as part of a 2015 debt restructuring. The warrants pay out if Ukraines economic growth exceeds certain thresholds. See Borensztein and Mauro (2002b) for an analysis of this proposal.
Our paper analyzes both qualitatively and quantitatively how the introduction of GDPindexed sovereign debt contracts affects borrowing, default, and the outcome of debt restructurings.
A Laboratory for Evaluation of Policy Interventions
We consider a small open endowment economy a la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) with a benevolent government. The country participates in international credit markets, where lenders are risk neutral. The country cannot commit to repaying its obligations, so given an outstanding amount of assets, b (debt if b < 0), it has two actions to choose from. The first option is to pay its obligations and hence keep its good credit status. Alternatively, the country may decide not to make its debt payment, i.e., default.
A default brings immediate financial autarky and a direct output loss to the defaulting country. After the initial default decision, the country may have the opportunity to return to international debt markets, but only after restructuring its debt. The restructuring of the debt may entail a haircut and a different maturity from the original defaulted portfolio.
In times of good credit status, the country may face a "lenders' high risk aversion" shock, a, where a = 1 if the country is facing lenders with high risk aversion in its access to financial markets and is hence more costly to rollover or changing its debt portfolio. The decision to default is influenced by the current level of debt and its maturity, by the country's income, y, which fluctuates exogenously over time, by the costs of default, by the risk-aversion shock, and by the expected terms of the restructuring.
If the country decides not to default, it selects the maturity of the new portfolio, m ′ , and the debt level, b ′ . The optimal choices of maturity and asset levels are influenced by the current level of income, the current level of debt and its maturity, and the risk-aversion shock. There is also a cost of adjusting the portfolio, which would be omitted from the equations in the main body of the paper for simplicity.
The conditions of the debt restructuring are endogenously determined via an alternatingoffers mechanism that resembles that of Benjamin and Wright (2013) . That is, each period in default, either the lender or the borrower has a chance to make a restructuring offer to the other party. In both cases, the offer consists of a menu of possible portfolios that the borrower may choose from. All these portfolios deliver the same value to the lender, although the value may differ depending on who is making the offer. A restructured portfolio in the proposed menu has yearly payments b R and maturity m R . If the lender is making the offer, the lender selects the set of (b R , m R ) pairs that, if accepted, maximizes the market value of the new portfolio. The restructuring proposal takes into account the incentives of the borrower to accept or not. If the borrower is the one proposing a deal, the borrower will choose the offer that makes the lender indifferent. However, if this value is sufficiently large, the borrower may choose not to make a restructuring offer at all.
We can characterize the problem of the government as either choosing to default or choosing the optimal debt and maturity combination.
The Country's Problem in Good Credit Standing
Under the economic setup described above, the country's value is
where V D and V P are the values if the country chooses to default and repay, respectively. The policy function D(y, a, b, m) is 1 if default is preferred and 0 otherwise.
In case of default the problem is simply
where y D = min {y, π} represents the income of the country net of the default punishment.
In case of repayment, the value is
The constraint implies that consumption is equal to income, y, net of debt payments, b, plus the net resources that are obtained from or paid to international markets, captured by the next two summands. 6 The first of these two summands depends on the market price of outstanding obligations, q(y, 0, b ′ , m ′ ; m−1), which takes into account the current income, y, the debt rollover shock, a = 0, and the obligations that the country will have from the beginning of the next period, 
The Country's Problem in Restructuring
We follow Benjamin and Wright (2013) in assuming that after a default, the borrower and lenders have an opportunity to make a restructuring offer. This opportunity alters stochastically between the borrower and lenders, and only one party can make an offer each period. In default, with probability λ the lender (L) offers a restructuring deal, and the sovereign borrower (S), the country, decides whether to accept. Similarly, with probability (1 − λ), the sovereign has the option to make a restructuring offer to the lender. In both cases, the offer specifies a value that the new restructured portfolio must attain, W .
Let H(y, a, b, m, W ) be the policy function that describes whether the offer is made by the country or accepted by the country in case that the lender made the offer (mathematically, it is exactly the same function). It takes value 1 if the offer is made/accepted and 0 otherwise. When making the offer, lenders face the acceptance function H(y, a, b, m, W ).
How is W determined? It depends on who is making the restructuring offer. If the country makes the offer, it must decide whether to make an offer or not. The lenders would only accept offers with market value larger than the current market value of debt in default; i.e., W ≥ −bq D (y, a, b, m; m) = W , where q D is the price of debt in default given the characteristics of the debt in default and current income y. Thus, if the country makes the restructuring offer, it will be such that the lender would be just indifferent between accepting or not; i.e.,
As we assume that if the country makes this offer the lender always accepts it, there is no point for the country to offer any larger value, and any smaller value will be definitely rejected by the lenders. However, recall that borrowers are not required to make the offer when they have the opportunity. The policy function described above is equal to one, i.e., H(y, a, b, m, W ) = 1 if the country makes the offer and is 0 otherwise.
If the lender makes the offer, it must take into account H(y, a, b, m, W ). If the lender decides to make the offer, it will offer
Note that we impose the constraint that the market value of the new debt portfolio cannot be larger than the face value of the debt in default. This constraint is the same as in Benjamin and Wright (2013) and is in line with bond acceleration clauses establishing that all future payments become due at the time of default.
The lender makes this offer only if W L (y, a, b, m) ≥ −bq D (y, a, b, m; m) . Importantly, if the lender makes the offer, the value obtains the same value that the country would obtain if the lender decides not to make the offer.
Given a value W agreed upon in the restructuring, the country chooses the new yearly payment, b R , the new maturity, m R , and a transfer of fresh money from the lenders to the country,
where the price of the debt being restructured, q E , takes into account that the country will be excluded from credit markets next period with probability δ.
Thus, the value of exiting restructuring with a deal of value W is simplỹ
where the value function V E represents the value of exclusion, what occurs after restructuring.
This value can be written as
where the country leaves exclusion in any period with probability δ.
To express the value of a country in restructuring, it is convenient to specify the functioñ V R , which is the same in two cases: (i) a country that received an offer of W , deciding whether to accept it, and (ii) a country considering whether to make an offer of W .
This function isṼ R (y, a, W, b, m) = max V D (y, a, b, m);Ṽ A (y, a, W ) . Using the notation presented in the previous subsection, the value of a country in restructuring can be expressed as a, b, m) ).
Equilibrium debt prices
The price of the country's debt must be consistent with zero expected discounted profits. The price of a non-defaulted bond of maturity n > 0 of a country with income y, yearly debt payment −b ′ , and portfolio maturity m ′ > 0, can be represented by
where S(a ′ , a) represents the pricing kernel. For example, if lenders were risk neutral in every period, S(a ′ , a) = 1/(1 + r).
After the country repays 1 unit today, the valuation of debt maturing in m−1 periods depends on the expectation about future payoffs associated with repayments, reflected in future prices when D = 0, and on future payoffs in default states, in which the relevant price will be q D , as explained below. Similarly, the price of debt used in the restructuring process can be written by
Note that the difference with the price in regular times is that with probability δ the country won't have access to credit markets.
The price per unit of yearly payment b ′ in default is q D , and has the expression
A lender with promises up to n years would obtain q D (y, a, b ′ , m ′ ; n) per dollar of yearly promises that she holds. This per-dollar payment, or bond price, depends on the total debt defaulted upon, which in this case is b ′ yearly payments for m ′ years. One key aspect affecting the cost of bor-rowing at different maturities is how the total repayment made by the country,
is divided across bondholders. The simplest part is reflected in the fraction 1 −b ′ . A bondholder entitled to one unit of yearly payments receives one over the total yearly payments promised.
Similarly, W L is distributed across lenders holding bonds of different maturity using the ratio q * (n;r R ) q * (m;r R ) , where q * (k; r R ) = k l=1 1 (1+r R ) l , which means that later payments are discounted at a constant rate r R .
Calibration, Estimation, and Evaluation
We solve the model numerically, calibrating the parameters based on the literature and available data and in the remaining cases selecting them jointly to reproduce key features.
Assigning the model's parameters
We calibrate the model to a yearly frequency. Households in the economy have a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility with risk aversion coefficient γ, which is set at 4, a value consistent with the macroeconomics literature. We set the maximum possible maturity to 15 years, which is significantly larger than the maturity observed for emerging markets. 7 The standard deviation of the income shock is set to 0.019, and the persistence is set to 0.86 to replicate the detrended GDP per capita process for Colombia as estimated in Sánchez, Sapriza and Yurdagul (2018) .
We set the interest rate used to limit how much the lenders can ask for in restructuring to r L = 0. Note that with this value the constraint would use the face-value of the debt in default as the maximum that the lenders can ask the country to repay. This is in line with bond clauses that establish that all future payments become due at the time of default. We set the rate used to discount payments of different maturity at the time of default equal to the risk-free rate; i.e., r R = r. As we show below, with this value the model is able to reproduce recent evidence presented by Asonuma, Trebesch and Ranciere (2015) , who argue that in present value terms, creditors with short-term securities suffer significantly more than creditors with long-term 7 Our results are robust to allowing for longer maximum maturities, but this increases the computational costs.
securities during sovereign debt restructuring episodes.
Following Dvorkin, Sánchez, Sapriza and Yurdagul (2019) , we set the Markov transition probability of lenders continuing to have a "low risk aversion" (a = 0), conditional on being in that state, to be 0.88 per year. The probability of continuing to have a "high risk aversion" conditional on being in that state is 0.42. As Dvorkin, Sánchez, Sapriza and Yurdagul (2019) show, this captures well the periods of systemic emerging market risk in the last three decades.
We set the risk aversion parameters in each of these regimes to capture the sudden increases in the EMBI+ spreads in periods of emerging market crisis. Our calibration implies a one period risk-free rate of 3.5% in the low risk aversion regime and 15% in the high risk aversion regime. 8
In addition, the value of the probability of remaining excluded after restructuring is set at 75 percent, δ = 0.75, also following Dvorkin, Sánchez, Sapriza and Yurdagul (2019) .
The parameters that were not preset above are jointly calibrated to minimize the distance of the model from the targets. Table 1 summarizes the model parameters and the fit of their target statistics. 9
We calibrate the discount factor, β, the threshold of income in the default loss function, π, and the probability of lenders making an offer after default, λ. As is standard in the literature, β and π are calibrated to replicate the debt-to-output ratio and the default rate. The probability of lenders making an offer after default, λ, affects directly the value of the haircut, so it is linked to that particular statistic. Table 1 shows the calibrated values and moments in the data and in the model. Note: Average values for the default rate and the debt-to-output in the data are based on Tomz and Wright (2013) . Average haircut is taken from Cruces and Trebesch (2013) , Table 1 .
Model Evaluation
In the previous sections, we introduced and calibrated a new model of maturity choice and debt restructuring in default. In this section, we evaluate the performance of the model using additional data. The model does remarkably well along with several dimensions.
Our model can closely match several key non-targeted empirical stylized facts of emerging markets. For exposition purposes, we divide these statistics into three groups. First, as illustrated in Table 2 for a sample of three well-known emerging market economies, our model closely captures the business cycles moments usually discussed in the literature of quantitative sovereign default models, such as the volatility of consumption relative to output volatility, which exceeds a value of 1 in the data and is just equal to one in the model, the volatility of the trade balance relative to output, the correlation of consumption with output, which is high and positive both in the model and the data, and the correlation of the trade balance with output, which is mild both in the model and in the sample data. Second, our model statistics also mimic closely the median sovereign debt maturity and duration from the data, as well as their cyclical behavior (Table 2) . 10 Overall, the model delivers a maturity of 5.4 years and a duration of 3.0 years, a bit below the values of the sample. Additionally, the model generates the lower debt maturity and duration found in the data during bad times. Specifically, during bad times, both debt maturity and duration in the model are about 20 percent lower than their averages, with maturity declining to 4.4 years and duration declining to 2.6 years, consistent with similar declines documented for the sample. Our model is Note: The first-order moments are country-specific means in the data and in the model. In the data (model), bad times are the years with detrended log-GDP (log-income shock) is below 0. See appendix for computational details and data sources.
also able to capture the positive correlation between maturity and duration with output generally observed in the data.
Third, as our study focuses on sovereign default risk, we also analyze sovereign bond yield spreads over risk-free debt instruments. 11 The results in Table 2 suggest that our framework underpredicts the level of the spreads, especially on the short end of the yield spread curve, which is to be expected in a model where bond prices are derived assuming risk-neutral lending. However, note that our spreads are lower than those in models with exogenous maturity because, especially for periods of high spreads, the country chooses a debt maturity that is shorter than the fixed maturity set by the standard calibration of those models. Nevertheless, our model captures very well the dynamics of yield spreads for different bond maturities over the business cycle. Finally, as summarized in Table 2 , yield spreads for 1-year and 10-year instruments are countercyclical, and spreads for short-term bonds are lower than those for longer-term instruments.
Results of Policy Interventions in Restructurings
Restructurings are usually associated with policy interventions, which often involve some IMF participation. Of the 17 arrangements reviewed in an IMF report for the period from 1998 to 2014 (IMF, 2014), 11 included conditionality related to the restructuring. In this section, we study policy interventions that affect the output of private negotiations between lenders and borrowers.
Technically, different behavioral and market features, such as agents' lack of commitment and incomplete markets, may justify policy interventions. Interestingly, we find that some of those policies may be ex-ante optimal. We compare welfare across different policy interventions using two different measures. On the one hand, we use the value function of a country with no debt and median income. Thus, the analysis can be contextualized as a country choosing which type of bond to issue from that period onward. Since this hypothetical country has no debt, a default is an event that may occur only in the remote future, so welfare gains or losses of restructuring may be small. On the other hand, we compute the welfare gains of a policy change evaluated by an agent with a different discount factor than the government in charge of choosing default and borrowing decisions. 12 This concept of welfare under disagreement was recently introduced by Aguiar, Amador and Fourakis (2019) to evaluate the potential gains of restricting countries' access to credit markets.
Welfare gains are measured in terms of consumption equivalent units (CE). They represent the percent change in consumption-in every period-necessary to make an agent in the original economy indifferent with being in the economy after the policy. If gains are positive, it means that they agent prefers to live in the economy with the policy.
12 Appendix B.3 gives the computation of these welfare measures.
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Imposing Minimum Market-Value Haircuts
As shown in Figure 1 , the minimum haircut induces a higher equilibrium. This is clear for values larger than 20 percent and for values larger than 80 percent the effect is one to one. The effects of this policy on debt and default are presented in Figure 2 . The dashed blue line in panel (a) shows that having a larger haircut is effective in reducing the probability of recurrent default. In particular, the probability of defaulting 3 years after the restructuring is reduced from 6 percent to less than 4 percent. Thus, the minimum haircut is useful to solve the "too little" problem. The "too late" part of the argument refers to the fact that countries wait too much until they restructure their debts. It can be analyzed in two ways in this Figure. Panel (a) also shows the overall probability of default (red solid lines). It shows that countries would default more often with larger minimum haircuts, although the effect is quantitatively small.
The second way to analyze this is by looking at the debt-to-income ratio at the time of default (panel (b), blue dashed line). If countries wait less to enter restructuring, they would default with less debt. In the model, this shown by the level of payment/GDP in the period of default.
It is decreasing with the value of minimum haircuts, showing that this policy also deals with the "too late" problem. Overall borrowing is decreasing for high values of minimum haircut (Figure 3 panel (a) ). The debt-to-income ratio decreases because lenders are less willing to extend credit, as it can be seen in the EMBI spread displayed in Figure (b) . An interesting fact about minimum haircut is that they increase debt maturity. As it is shown in Figure (c) , maturity increases from 5 years to more than 10 years (red solid line). One driving force for this result is that with a larger minimum haircuts, countries can exit restructuring with a longer debt maturity (dashed blue line). Overall, Figure ? ? shows that the changes induced by a minimum haircut imply small but positive gains, as long as it is are smaller than 40 percent. Considering the gains of a country that starts with zero debt and mean income in panel (a), a minimum haircut of 30 percent seems optimal from the perspective. If there is disagreement and individuals in the economy are more patient (only by 1 percent), they would prefer a minimum haircut of 20 percent presumably because in that economy total debt and default would be lower. The gains considering the transition are presented in panel (b) . In this case the gains depends on the state of the country.
The red line represents the median gains, which are smaller because the median state is quite far from default. They are positive up to a minimum haircut of 30 percent. This is interesting because if countries would have to vote for a reform, these results suggested that the policy would be approved. Remember here that to compute these gains the country must compensate lenders for their losses, so in this case the gains are obtained despite the fact that the country pays a transfer to the lenders such that they are indifferent. The same transfer occurs in the case of a country that have already defaulted but has not yet restructured its debt, which is represented by the dashed green line. Our results suggest that the gains are larger for countries in this situation. 
(b) Gains including transitions
The gains described in the previous plot are quite small. The maximum welfare gain plotted, which correspond to a minimum haircut of 30 percent and for a country that defaulted and it is waiting for restructuring, it is about 0.03 percent. This is about 4 times the number Robert E. Lucas (1987) obtained for the welfare gains of stabilization using empirically plausible values for the parameters. Lucas also showed that gain must be be lower than 0.1 percent and, more recently, using asset pricing data, Alvarez and Jermann (2004) concluded that gains of stabilization must be smaller than 0.3 percent.
A Rule for Distributing Losses Across Creditors
In the model, the proceedings of a restructuring are distributed to lenders with bonds of different maturities according to a discounting rule of q * (n;r R ) q * (m;r R ) , where n is the maturity of a bond and m is that of the entire portfolio. Here, q * (n; r R ) is the present value of n payments, discounted at rate r R , which in turn shapes the relative returns for each maturity. Accordingly, this rule determines the losses to bondholders with bonds of different maturities, which are in general non-uniform.
To illustrate the direct implications of changing r R , we construct the shares of the total value that the country repays in default that are obtained by holders of zero-coupon bonds of maturity 1, 3, and 8 years. These values can be represented as follows:
• share obtained by bondholders of 1-year maturity zero-coupon bonds = q * (1;r R ) q * (10;r R ) ,
• share obtained by bondholders of 3-year maturity zero-coupon bonds = q * (3;r R ) q * (10;r R ) − q * (2;r R ) q * (10;r R ) ,
• share obtained by bondholders of 8-year maturity zero-coupon bonds = q * (8;r R ) q * (10;r R ) − q * (7;r R ) q * (10;r R ) . Figure 5 shows how these values change as a function of r R . Clearly, since the structure of years payments is flat in our setup, if we set r R = 0 the bondholders of different maturity will get the same share-if the total maturity is 10, that share is 1/10. As r R increases, the share obtained by bondholders of 1-year maturity zero-coupon bonds increase and the share obtained by bondholders of 8-year maturity zero-coupon bonds decreases. Notice that at r R = 50 percent the share obtained by bondholders of 1-year maturity zero-coupon bonds reaches more than 30 percent. The effects on credit spreads are significant. The term premium increases by 1 percentage point, as shown by panel (a) of Figure 6 . In bad times, the spread of short bonds decreases and the spread of long bond decreases, as shown in panel (b). This occurs because as countries approach default, the bond prices reflect how much they would recover in restructuring. The spread of the overall portfolio (EMBI) also decreases, driven by a lower EMBI in bad times, which, in turn, is affected by the spreads of short maturity in bad times-panel (c). To take advantage of a lower financing cost for low maturities in bad times, maturity becomes cyclical, as shown in Figure 7, panel (a) . Because of this lower cost of short term debt in bad times, countries are able to avoid more defaults, as displayed in panel (b) . The default rate falls from 1.65 to 1.35 percent, a reduction of almost 20 percent. Since long-term rates are relatively higher than short-term rates as r R increases, the equilibrium maturity decreases with r R . Finally, Figure 8 shows that the change in welfare is minimal after introducing this policy.
The highest level is again obtained by a country that is in default and has not yet restructured its debt; gains are as large as 0.04 percent for a value of r R = 0.5, which is quite extreme. 
An international lender of last resort
To assess the policy implications of having an international LOLR, we slightly modify the model equations presented in Section 3. The value of a country in good credit standing is now
where V D and V P are the same values defined above and V LR represents the option to access the international LOLR,
where M → ∞. The value of country borrowing from the LOLR is
The first constraint implies that consumption is equal to income in the period the country borrows from the lenders the last resort. Thus, the country is borrowing from this lender to raise exactly the amount b.
Note that there are two key parameters determining this policy. The rate at which this institution is lending, given by the rate r A , and the cutoff in the debt-to-income ratio to have access to this lender, χ. According to the Bagehot's rule, r A must be a high rate. The parameter χ captures the conditionality mentioned by Fischer (1999) , which in our model is written in terms of a threshold for the debt-to-income ratio. Countries would know that to have access to this facility, they must keep the value of the debt-to-output ratio below some threshold.
We consider two interest rates: 8 percent and 12 percent. At this rates, countries would go to the LOLR if they have to pay more expensive rates in the market. Recall that in our framework Panel (a) of Figure 9 shows how often countries use the LOLR under different schemes in terms of the maximum debt-to-income ratio to qualify and the rate charged on the loans. The probability of assistance is significantly higher if the rate is 8 percent instead of 12 percent. In fact, the assistance is almost non-existent for an interest rate of 12 percent unless the maximum debt/GDP ratio to qualify is at 25 percent or higher. For r A = 8 percent, the probability is much higher and it reaches 16 percent when the maximum debt/GDP ratio to qualify is at 30 percent. Panel (b) of Figure 9 shows that these loans are profitable for the LOLR. The internal rates of return are mostly between 6 and 8 percent. 13 What is the main effect of having access to a LOLR? Figure 10 shows that the main effect is to decrease the incidence of default. If the LOLR lends at 8 percent, the incidence of default drops drastically, from more than 1.5 percent to less than 1 percent, for the cases with thresholds of 20 and 25 percent of debt-to-income ratio. If the rate charged is 12 percent, the default rate also decreases significantly when the policy has a maximum debt-to-income threshold of 30 percent. What are the unintended consequences of having access to a LOLR? Figure 11 shows that if access is cheap (r A = 8 percent), countries would reduce maturity because in case of sudden stops they would have access to credit to rollover debts. Countries would also increase borrowing unless the maximum level of debt is set at less than 30 percent. Notice, however, that with the rate of 12 percent the unintended consequences are not present anymore. 
(b) Maturity
Finally, we evaluate if there are welfare gains associated with introducing a LOLR. Figure   12 panel (a) shows that welfare gains are between 0.05 and 0.1 percent for a country starting with no debt and mean income. The red lines represent the welfare in the case with a r A = 8%.
When there is agreement between the government and the agents in terms of the discount factor, the optimal policy has a loose limit of 30 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. With disagreement, gains would be about one third of the ones with agreement for the case preferred by the government because agents dislike the increase in debt. The best scheme in that case is a tight condition to qualify at 20-25 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. The policy gains with a rate r A = 12% have the same shape but a lower level. In conclusion, a policy with r A = 8 percent and a threshold between 20-25 percent debt-to-GDP ratio seems to be the preferred specification, as it would be beneficial under both agreement and disagreement, and it would achieve a significant reduction in default without an increase in debt. Figure 12 shows the median gains for countries in the stationary distribution of debt, maturity, and income. The shape of the gains with respect to the threshold is similar to the ex-ante gains with agreement. However, the level of welfare gains is larger. The level is even larger, reaching almost 0.125 percent for r A = 8 and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 30 percent for a countries that have already defaulting and are waiting to restructure their debt.
GDP-indexed bonds
As the country can now issue GDP-indexed bonds during debt restructurings, we need to introduce new notation. Let Ψ(y ′ /y) be the factor for which the debt is adjusted as a function of the change in income, y ′ /y. We use Ψ(y ′ /y) as an step function, where
The thresholds for indexation are set at 1 and 1.03 because, on average, upon exiting a restructuring, economies recover at an annual growth rate between 1 and 2 percent (see Sánchez, Sapriza and Yurdagul (2018) ). If the economy recovers significantly faster than expected (growth rate above 3 percent), the payments are adjusted upwards, and if it does not recover, they are adjusted downward.
The expression for the value function of the country in restructuring becomes
where the country leaves exclusion in any period with probability δ. The new feature of the model due to the introduction of indexed debt, is that the yearly payment grows at the gross rate Ψ(y ′ /y)), which depends on income growth.
The price of debt used during restructuring is q E (y, a, b ′ , m ′ ; n) =
The main policy-relevant question about indexed-bonds issued in a restructuring, is whether they help reduce the incidence of default in the years following the restructuring. Figure 13 shows different default rates for two parameterization of this policy. The green dash line represents the case in which bonds are adjusted up when income increases more than 3 percent, and adjusted down when income does not grow. We refer to this case as the "symmetric" indexation because ∆ H = ∆ L > 0. The solid red line represents the policy in which the payments are only adjusted upward, which occurs if income increases more than 3 percent. We refer to this case as "upside only" indexation because ∆ H > 0 and ∆ L = 0. The size of the adjustment in payments is represented in the x-axis, where we consider a maximum adjustment of 10 percent (∆ = 0.1).
Recall that the adjustment occurs while the country is in exclusion after restructuring, so the payments are increasing exactly by the rate shown in the x-axis.
The effect of both indexation schemes on default incentives is sizeable, but it is more significant under the symmetric indexation case (green dashed line). The probability of default 2 years after the restructuring is reduced from 7 to 5 percent when the adjustment is increased from 0 to 10 percent, as shown by panel (a). Similarly, when considering a longer post-restructuring horizon, as shown in panel (b), we find that the probability of default in the years 2 to 5 after the debt restructuring also decreases significantly for both indexing specifications, but especially under the symmetric case. Finally, panel (c) shows that the overall default rate edges down as the adjustment rate increases, but to have an economically relevant impact on the default rate, it would be necessary to implement a rule with a large adjustment rate and a symmetric indexation. While the main reason for introducing GDP-indexed bonds in restructurings seems justified by their effect on default in the years following the restructuring, a natural question is what is the effect on other variables. Figure 14 shows that the effect on other variables is minimal. One possible interpretation for the downward adjustment in the symmetric policy specification, is a preemptive automatic restructuring that reduces the payments if income does not recover. To "compensate" lenders, under these indexed bonds the country also promises that payment will increase if income recovers at a quicker pace than anticipated (more than 3 percent annual growth).
The ex-ante welfare gains of this policy are increasing in the size of the debt adjustment but the level is very low, as shown in panel (a) of Figure 15 . In the case of the symmetric policy, countries would gain more than with the upside only adjustment, and disagreement reduces the level of gains but not the shape with respect to the debt adjustment. 
(b) Gains including transitions
Considering the transition is interesting because as displayed in panel (b) of Figure 15 the level of gains is much larger for countries that have defaulted but have not yet restructured their debt.
Conclusion
We evaluate policy proposals for debt restructuring using a model of sovereign debt, maturity choice, default, and restructuring that quantitatively mimics the key debt maturity and payment dynamics surrounding distressed debt restructurings while retaining the business cycle properties of debt and the yield spread curve observed in the data.
Our work provides a useful tool to discuss the implications of alternative policy interventions for restructuring outcomes. We show that a policy implementing a minimum haircut during restructurings can significantly help to address the "too little, too late" concern that has been reflected in costly repeated restructurings. We also consider a policy addressing coordination and aggregation concerns among creditors holding bonds of different maturities, which arise especially in pre-default debt restructurings: we find that a rule that tilts the distribution of creditor losses during restructurings toward holders of short maturity bonds reduces short term yield spreads and maturity in bad times, reducing the overall portfolio borrowing costs and associated default probability of the sovereign during periods of elevated credit market stress. We also find that a policy allowing for LOLR lending at subsidized, yet profitable rates, similar to the PLL or the FCL offered by the IMF, could lead to shorter debt maturity, and a lower frequency of both defaults and repeated restructurings. Finally, the use of GDP-indexed bond contracts during restructurings could help remedy the lack of market access experienced by troubled borrowers, and significantly reduce the probability of repeated restructurings, thus also helping to address the "too late" problem of current restructurings.
provided by the WDI for the entire period for which we have available data on spreads and maturity.
• Consumption: For the moments on consumption, we use households' final consumption expenditure per capita (constant 2005 US$), provided by the WDI. For the volatility and correlations, the paper follows the same approach as for the GDP per capita, by HP filtering the log consumption per capita for the entire period. We also use this variable to construct the trade balance by subtracting consumption from output.
• Maturity: We use the external debt maturity. For Colombia (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) and Brazil (2005 Brazil ( -2015 the data are from the HAVER database, and for Mexico (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) from the OECD database.
• Duration: We use the data available in the HAVER database for the duration of debt for Colombia, as we do for the maturity for this country. This measure of duration follows the Macaulay definition, as we use for our computations in the model. For Brazil and Mexico, we compute the duration using the maturity data described above for these countries, together with the official average interest on new external debt commitments provided by the International Debt Statistics, also following the Macaulay definition.
• Spreads: The yields are US dollar sovereign yields obtained from Bloomberg. The yield spreads are obtained by subtracting US yields from the same data source.
points on these grids, and discrete search is conducted to find the optimal debt policy also over these. The price function is solved for 41 equally-spaced points on this grid and the implied function is linearly interpolated in the other parts of the algorithm. Since the steeper regions of the price function is where default usually happens, we have an uneven grid for income that is finer below the median income. In particular, the income grid is spread evenly below the median income over 40 points, and evenly above the median income grid over 10 points. We use the Tauchen method to discretize the income process.
We solve for the lenders' offer, W L (y, a, b, m), through a discrete search over 501 points on a state-specific evenly-spaced W -grid. The lowest point on the grid is 0 and the highest is min[0.7, −b × m]. Since the borrowers' offer W S (y, a, b, m) is equal to −b q D (y, a, b, m; m) it is not necessary to follow the same discrete search as W L for W S .
For convergence, we use a measure of distance for the price function of debt in good standing in a given iteration that takes into account the maximum absolute distance of the prices across two iterations relative to the level of the price in a given state. We declare convergence when this error is lower than 10 −5 . We update the lenders' offer only when this error is < 10 −4 .
After solving for the policy and value functions, we run the simulations for 1500 countries (paths) for 400 years and drop the first 100 periods. The model counterparts to the empirical correlation and standard deviation statistics are averages across samples. For the first-order moments, country-specific means are taken before averaging across countries. This is consistent with our treatment of the data.
B.2 Computing spreads and duration
Spreads. For a country with income y, debt rollover shock a, and a debt portfolio choice with maturity m ′ and level b ′ . The yield for a bond with maturity n is Y T M (y, a, b, m; n) ≡ 1 q(y, a, b, m; n) − q(y, a, b, m; n − 1) 1 n − 1.
Notice that in our model, the risk-free yield that we should use to get the spreads from the wherer is the discount rate for the new portfolio given in (3). For maturity, we simply use the maturity of the new portfolio, m.
B.3 Computing the welfare gains from policy experiments
For each alternative model, we simulate N id paths for N T periods starting from no debt, mean income, and low risk aversion realization (i.e. b = 0, y = 1, a = 0). For each path we compute present discounted value of the realized consumption stream from the perspective of the initial period, asV i (β) = N T t=0β t u(c it ) and take the average of these values,V (β) = Median welfare gain in transition. In order to obtain the welfare gains in transition, we use the simulations coming out of our baseline economy.
For each observation in good financial standing at the end of period t ≥t, we define the compensated value from switching to a world with an alternative restructuring rule at the end of the current period as: 14
Here, the variables c it , b it+1 , m it+1 denote the consumption, asset and maturity choices of a country i in the baseline simulation at period t. x it denotes the hypothetical losses of lenders from implementing the switch from the baseline to the alternative policy:
Notice that the if the price becomes higher after the switch, the losses of lenders are negative, and we give additional resources to the country to compute the compensated value measure.
Meanwhile, the value from staying in the baseline is:
For these countries, that are in good financial standing at the end of the current period, our measure of welfare gain from the switch is:
In this exercise, we set the thresholdt at 200, in order to have the observations in the baseline simulations after this period to follow the corresponding ergodic distribution.
For the countries in financial exclusion at the end of the period t ≥t, we follow a similar approach using the debt prices and expected values in default.
Welfare gain for a country with no debt Similar to above, we compute an alternative measure of welfare gains only computing the W it for the case with b it = 0, m it = 8, y it =ȳ, a it = 0, and with good credit record.
Note that we can do this computation simply by using the policy, value and price functions of the two economies, without using the simulations.
B.4 Computing lenders' losses in Section 5.2.
In order to get the losses of lenders following a default, we focus on holders of zero-coupon bond of maturity n. Suppose that the sovereign has a portfolio with maturity m i , debt level −b i , and income y. We define the losses plotted in Figure ? ? as:
Loss(y, b, m; n) = 1 − q D (y D , b i , m i ; n) − q D (y D , b i , m i ; n − 1) q(y, 0, b, m; n) − q(y, 0, b, m; n − 1) .
In this formula, the nominator is the expected return to a unit of zero-coupon bond with maturity n if the debt is in default. The denominator is the price of the same bond if the debt is in good standing and the borrower has access to financial markets (no debt rollover shock, i.e. a = 0).
